Supreme Court of India
Clarifies the Law on Consent and False Promises of Marriage: A Detailed Legal
Analysis of Biswajyoti Chatterjee v. State of West Bengal (2025)
Introduction
In the ever-evolving landscape of
criminal jurisprudence, the interpretation of "consent" under Section
375 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) continues to spark vital legal debates. The
Supreme Court's decision in Biswajyoti Chatterjee v. State of West Bengal
& Anr., Criminal Appeal No. ___ of 2025 (arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.
4261 of 2024) adds substantial depth to this discourse. This judgment revolves
around a retired judicial officer, Biswajyoti Chatterjee, and his alleged
involvement in a physical relationship under a purported false promise of
marriage.
The key elements of the case—its
factual matrix, legal contentions, judicial reasoning, and broader
implications—are presented in a structured, educational manner.
Background of the Case
The Factual Matrix
The appellant, Biswajyoti
Chatterjee, is a retired Additional District Judge. He was accused by the
complainant (a divorced woman) of engaging in a sexual relationship with her
based on a false promise to marry. According to the complainant, Chatterjee assured
her of marriage and agreed to support her child from a prior marriage. Their
relationship, which continued for several years, was marked by repeated sexual
encounters. Upon the finalization of her divorce, Chatterjee allegedly began
distancing himself and ultimately refused to marry her.
Legal Charges Framed
Based on the complainant's
allegations, an FIR was registered under the following sections:
- Section 376(2)(f) IPC – Rape by a person in
a position of trust or authority
- Section 417 IPC – Cheating
- Section 506 IPC – Criminal intimidation
The Magistrate took cognizance of
the complaint, and the case proceeded. Chatterjee sought discharge from the
trial court, which was dismissed. The Calcutta High Court, in its revisionary
jurisdiction, upheld the trial court’s decision, prompting Chatterjee to
approach the Supreme Court of India via a Special Leave Petition (SLP).
Legal Issues Raised
The Supreme Court was called upon
to address critical questions:
- Does a consensual relationship become rape if it
is based on a broken promise to marry?
- What constitutes a false promise within the
meaning of Section 375 IPC?
- Can the continuation of a consensual
relationship after the alleged promise weaken the prosecution's case?
- Does the accused’s status as a former judge
aggravate the offense under Section 376(2)(f)?
Legal Framework and Precedents
Section 375 IPC and the
Concept of Consent
Section 375 of IPC defines rape
and includes within its situations where consent is obtained through
"misconception of fact." Explanation 2 to Section 375 clarifies that
a consent given under a misconception of fact is not valid. The Supreme Court
has, in previous rulings, addressed whether a promise to marry, later
retracted, could fall within this scope.
Judicial Precedents Cited
The following landmark judgments
guided the Court’s interpretation:
1. Uday v. State of Karnataka
(2003) 4 SCC 46
Held that if a promise to marry
is not false at the time it was made, the resulting consensual act does not
amount to rape.
2. Deepak Gulati v. State of
Haryana (2013) 7 SCC 675
Distinguished between cases where
the promise was genuine but later not fulfilled and cases where the promise was
a mere tool to exploit.
3. Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v.
State of Maharashtra (2019) 9 SCC 608
Emphasized the requirement of
proving that the promise was false at inception and intended to deceive.
Supreme Court’s Analysis and
Findings
The Supreme Court bench
comprising Justices B.V. Nagarathna and Satish Chandra Sharma provided a
detailed and nuanced interpretation of the facts and legal principles involved.
1. Nature of Consent
The Court reiterated that consent
must be free, voluntary, and informed. It emphasized that when such consent is
vitiated by a promise that is false at the time it was made, it could
amount to rape.
However, in the present case, it
was observed that the relationship was long-standing and continued over time.
There was no evidence that the promise of marriage was false from the
beginning. On the contrary, the conduct of the complainant suggested continued
voluntary association with the appellant.
2. The Question of False
Promise
The Court emphasized that merely
not fulfilling a promise later does not automatically make it a false promise.
It noted:
"The broken promise, without
anything more, cannot be equated with a false promise made with a deliberate
intent to deceive."
This distinction proved crucial
in determining the criminality of Chatterjee’s actions.
3. Abuse of Legal Provisions
The bench warned against the
growing tendency of using criminal provisions such as Section 376 IPC as a “weapon
for vengeance” when intimate relationships break down. It noted:
“The law is meant to protect, not
to be used as a tool of personal vendetta when relationships sour.”
4. Quashing of Proceedings
Exercising its inherent powers
under Article 136 of the Constitution and Section 482 CrPC, the Supreme Court
quashed the FIR and the criminal proceedings. It held that the charges lacked
the legal and factual foundation required to constitute the alleged offences.
Significance of the Judgment
This judgment offers multiple
layers of relevance:
A. For Criminal Law
Jurisprudence
- Clarifies the threshold for vitiated consent under
Section 375 IPC
- Reinforces the necessity of mens rea (intention to
deceive) at the time of making a marriage promise
B. For Gender Justice
- Balances the rights of women to protection from
exploitation with the protection of men from malicious prosecution in
consensual relationships
C. For Legal Practice
- Acts as precedent for future bail, discharge, and
quashing applications in similar cases
Broader Legal and Social
Implications
The judgment implicitly critiques
the misuse of legal provisions and calls for judicial sensitivity in
evaluating cases involving intimate relationships. It encourages law
enforcement agencies and the judiciary to examine the intent and
circumstances rather than treating every unfulfilled promise as inherently
criminal.
Conclusion
The Biswajyoti Chatterjee v.
State of West Bengal case is a landmark decision that strikes a fine
balance between preventing exploitation and ensuring that criminal law is not
misused for personal vendetta. The Supreme Court’s detailed legal analysis
reaffirms that consent, to be valid, must be both informed and free from
deceit—but not every failed relationship translates into a criminal offence.
This case adds a critical layer
of understanding to Indian rape jurisprudence, particularly in the context of
evolving social norms and intimate relationships. Legal practitioners,
scholars, and students must closely examine this ruling, as it will undoubtedly
shape future interpretations of "consent" and "false
promises" under Indian criminal law.
FAQs
1. What was the key legal
question in the Chatterjee case?
Whether a consensual sexual
relationship based on an unfulfilled promise of marriage amounts to rape under
Section 376 IPC.
2. What did the Supreme Court
decide?
It quashed the FIR, holding that
the promise to marry was not made with the intent to deceive and that the
relationship was consensual.
3. What legal principles did
the Court rely upon?
It relied on Uday v. State of
Karnataka, Pramod Pawar v. State of Maharashtra, and Deepak
Gulati v. State of Haryana.
4. Does this ruling encourage
misuse of consent laws?
No. Instead, it discourages
misuse of rape laws in failed relationships while still protecting genuine
victims.
5. Why is this case important
for law students?
It provides a clear example of
how courts interpret "consent" and "false promise" within
criminal law, offering valuable precedent for academic and professional use.
